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N/A: Veterans' Re-Employment Rights under the Universal Military Train

VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER
THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND
SERVICE ACT-SENIORITY PROVISIONS
The continuing conflict in Southeast Asia is causing displacement of many
civilian employees who enter military service. In time these employees will
return to their civilian jobs, creating re-employment problems for both the
returning veteran and the individual who replaced him during his absence.
In light of this current international situation, it is the purpose of this
Note to present the more basic provisions of the veterans' re-employment
rights under the Universal Military Training and Service Act.' Emphasis
will be placed on the seniority provisions of the act because recent court
decisions have made significant changes in the interpretation of these provisions and have created uncertainty as to the ambit of their operation.
Finally, suggestions as to the desirable shape for future development in the
interpretation of these provisions will be discussed.
E-im.PLoyr.rT PROVISIONS OF THE AcT2

Congress first s granted re-employment rights to veterans in the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940. 4 In 1948 the title of this act was changed
to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, wherein Section 9 contains the principal veteran's re-employment rights.5 Since the only
major change was in the title of the act, many propositions settled under
the pre-1948 version of the act are pertinent and entitled to considerable
weight in the interpretation of the current law. The purpose of the statute
has been variously described, but generally this remedial legislation, was
designed to aid the returning veteran in rehabilitation to civilian life0 and,
insofar as possible, to prevent any disadvantage accruing to a veteran because
of his military service. 7
For a veteran to be eligible for the protections afforded by the act, he
must first have performed a certain type of military service. The act now
1 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1964). Throughout the text, this statute will be referred
to as "the act."
2 This background material is not intended to be a detailed analysis of veterans' reemployment rights; rather, it is presented as a foundation for a better understanding of
the seniority provisions of the act.
3 See 86 CONG. Rae. 10107 (1940) (remarks of Senator Danaher).
4 54 Stat. 890 (1940).
5 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459 (1964).
6 Donner v. Levine, 232 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1956).
7

Kephart v. United States, 109 Ct Cl. 646, 74 F. Supp. 578 (1947); see Fishgold v.

Sullivan Corp., 328 US. 275, 284 (1946); Kay v. General Cable Corp.. 59 F. Supp. 358

(D.N.J. 1945); S. RP. No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
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applies to inductees8 as well as enlistees,9 but generally the latter will lose
their re-employment rights if their service commitment exceeds four years. 10
Furthermore, the veteran must have left his civilian position for the purpose
of entering the armed services," and he must have satisfactorily completed
his period of training and service and have received a certificate to that
effect. 12 However, leave-of-absence rights are given when one leaves his job
for the purpose of having a military physical examination but is found
unfit and consequently rejected.' 3 Coverage has been extended to reservists
on active duty14 and to reservists and national guardsmen on training duty.15
Assuming that the nature of a veteran's military service is within that contemplated by the act, he is not thereby automatically entitled to re-employment. Only employment by a private employer, the United States govern.
ment, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia is covered by
federal law, 16 but many states have passed statutes which bring the same
basic protections to their employees. 17 Furthermore, the act is applicable
only to those positions which are "other thin temporary."'s The question of
what constitutes a temporary position was the subject of much litigation in
the earlier years of the act; the courts generally holding the intention of the
parties to be decisive. 19 This intent is usually determined by an investigation
8 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459(g)(2) (1964).
9 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459(g)(1) (1964).
10 Ibid. This subsection provides that an enlistee may serve four years plus any period
imposed by law without loss of statutory rights. Further, if a person serves no more than
four years active duty during the period June 24, 1948, to August 1, 1961, this subsection
allows him to serve an additional four year period after August 1, 1961, and still not
lose his rights under the act.
11 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b) (1964). For a discussion of this provision see Anglin v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 77 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. W. Va. 1948). The phrases "leaves a position" and
"re-employment" can be misleading. The legislative history and various Supreme Court
decisions indicate that the employment relationship does not cease but actually continues
while the veteran is in the service. See MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1948), reversing and remanding, 70 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
12 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b)(1) (1964). The requirements for receiving such a certificate
are set forth in 50 U.S.C. Ap. § 459(a) (1964). But it should be noted that re-employment
rights are not conditioned on an honorable discharge, nor are they available to all veterans except those dishonorably discharged. Rather, the veteran must complete that service which the armed forces requires of him. Then, and only then, is he entitled to a
certificate. See generally SoLicrroR's LEGAL GUIDE AND CASE DIGES-VETERANs' RE-izPLOYMENT RIGHTS 289-295 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SouCrroR's GUIDE].
13 50 U.S.C. AP. § 459(g)(5) (1964).
14 50 U.S.C. AP. § 459(g)(2) (1964).
15 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459(g)(4) (1964).
18 50 U.S.C. AP. § 459(b)(2)(A), (B) (1964).
17 Approximately twenty states have statutes granting similar re-employment rights to
veterans. These statutes are listed in the SoucrroR's GUIDE, § 1.14, at 19.
18 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b) (1964).
19 See, e.g., Salzman v. London Coat of Boston, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1945),
modified, 156 F.2d 538 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1946).
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of all circumstances surrounding the employment rather than by the designation or label of the employment contract.2 0 Noting the express wording of
the statute, the courts have favored the returning veteran by a liberal
interpretation of the phrase "other than temporary." For example, one court
classified a job as being other than temporary even though both employer
and employee contemplated employment for an indefinite period of time
and either party could terminate the contract at will.21
Even though the veteran establishes his qualification under the above
mentioned requirements, he is still not guaranteed re-employment. But
at this point, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the returning
veteran is not entitled to receive the benefits of the act. Generally, the
employer is not required to re-employ a veteran if it is shown that he no
longer has the capacity to perform the duties required by the job because
of his physical condition, his standards of performance or his disloyalty to
the employer,22 or if it is impossible or unreasonable to reinstate him because of changes in the employer's circumstances.23 In mitigation of the first
defense, there is a presumption that the veteran is physically qualified
for the work; and any changes in his physical condition must be substantial
before the employer can successfully raise this bar to re-employment. The
apparent harshness of the second defense, that a returning veteran must
meet certain performance standards relevant to the type of work to which he
returns, is limited because the veteran is given a reasonable period of time
in which to reacquire the skills or to recover from other performance
handicaps imposed by his absence from work.2 5 The third defense, that no
employee disloyal to his employer is qualified to perform any job for him,
has been held to mean a disloyalty which causes or threatens damage to the
employer's economic well-being;2 6 a mere disagreement with the employer
20 E.g., Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 229 (1966); Moe v. Eastern Air
Lines, 246 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1957); Spearmon v. Thompson, 167 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1948);
Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 160 F.2d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 1947).
21 Bryon v. Griffin, 166 F.2d 748, 750 (6th Cir. 1949).
22 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 459(b)(B)(i) (1964).
23 50 U.S.C. ApP. 459(b)(B) (1964). Courts have frequently held that the purpose of this
defense is to relieve the employer of the need to retain a needless job simply because it
was formerly occupied by a serviceman. E.g., Allyn v. Abad, 167 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1948);
Gallant v. Segal, 74 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.H. 1947). In Dyer v. Holston Mfg. Co., 237 F. Supp.
287 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), plaintiff was in a layoff status when she joined the armed serices.
Her position, as a string knitter, had become obsolete in the industry. The court held
that her position no longer existed for the purposes of reinstatement.
24 Stubbins v. Northrop Aircraft, Inc., 12 Labor Cases
63521 (D.C. Calif. 1946). Moreover, pre-existing defects are not a bar to reinstatement. Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., 162 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1947).
25 Gacey v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 66 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1946); Kay v. General Cable
Corp., 59 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 1945).
26 Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 160 F.2d 413 (Ist Cir. 1947) (employee threatened to
"rule or ruin" the company); Frank v. Tru-Vue, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. IIl 1946)
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is not sufficient to make the veteran unqualified to perform his previous
work.2 7 Finally, the employer is not required to re-employ the veteran if it
is impossible or unreasonable to reinstate him due to changes in the em.
ployer's circumstances. Ordinarily, the reorganization of a business is not
considered a sufficient change in circumstances to deny re-employment.28
The same is true even if the business is sold or transferred, for the act
provides that a veteran otherwise qualified for re-employment must be
restored by the former employer or his "successor in interest." 2 The
numerous problems which may arise under this provision are made more
complex by circumstances such as a sale of only that part of the business
with which the veteran was associated, extensive and complex corporate
reorganizations, decline or change in the nature of the employer's business
causing the veteran's job to be abolished during his absence, and the extent
to which automation and production reorganization may rapidly change
the nature of jobs and the skills required to perform them. A caveat is in
order: A myriad of problems can arise under each of the aforementioned
limitations, and any generalization grossly oversimplifies the problem and
minimizes the difficulties of proof for the employer.
SENIORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ACr

The basic seniority provision of the act is section 9(b)(2)(B)(i), 80 which

places a duty on the employer to restore a returning veteran to his former
(threat and attempt to destroy part of former employer's business); McClayton v. W. B.
Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1946) (creation of competing corporation and attempts
to hire former employer's workers).
27 See Font v. Puerto Cement Corp., 10 Labor Cases
62864 (D.P.R. 1945) (veteran's
political and economic opinion different from those of employer).
28 E.g., Karas v. Klein, 70 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1947) (partnership reorganized Into
corporation); Kan v. Tsang, 74 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Calif. 1947), rev'd on other grounds,
173 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1949) (corporation reorganized into limited partnership).
29 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b)(B)(i) (1964). In Cox v. Feeders Supply Co., 344 F.2d 925 (6th
Cir. 1965), it was found that in the sale of a business the new owner was not a "successor
in interest" and therefore the veteran was denied re-employment rights under the act.
30 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 459(b)(B)(i) (1964). The text of the relevant seniority provisions Is
as follows:
(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the employ
of any employer and who (1)receives such certificate, and (2) makes application for
reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service or
from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one
year(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person shall(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by such
employer or his successor in interest to such position or to a position of like seniority,
status, and pay; or

(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position by reason of disability
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position or to a position of "like seniority, status, and pay." Subsection 9(c)
seeks to clarify the word "like," by providing that the returning veteran is
to be considered by his employer as having been on furlough or leave of
absence from his civilian employment during his period of training and
service in the armed forces. 31 In interpreting subsection (c), the Supreme
Court in Fishgoldv. Sullivan Dydock & Repair Corp.,32 announced the now
well known "escalator" principle:
sustained during such service but qualified to perform the duties of any other posi.
tion in the employ of such employer or his successor in interest, be restored by such
employer or his successor in interest to such other position the duties of which he is
qualified to perform as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case, unless the
employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable
to do so;
(c)(1) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) of this section shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service
in the armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to
participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in
effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and
shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such
restoration.
(2) It is declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is restored
to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection
(b) of this section should be so restored in such manner as to give him such status
in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in such employment continuously from the time of his entering the armed forces until the time of
his restoration to such employment.
For a discussion of this and other provisions of the act see Annot., 29 A.L.Md 1279

(1953).
31 50 U.S.C. A'p. § 459(c)(1) (1964). This footnote is not intended as an exhaustive
study of the "furlough" and "leave of absence" provision of the act. This provision, however, can be a source of confusion. Therefore, it is important to note that the escalator
principle controls in seniority matters. As the Supreme Court in Accardi v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 383 US. 225 (1966), said in reference to the "furlough' or "leave of absence" provision:
Without attempting in this case to determine the exact scope of this provision of
§ 8(c) [of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940] it is enough to say that we
consider that it was intended to add certain protections to the veteran and not to
take away those which are granted him by § 8(b)(B) and the other clauses of § 8(c).
Id. at 252. This coincides with the view expressed in the SotacrroRs GuID:
The dearly established rule is that no right protected by the escalator principle is
limited or diminished by the operation of either of the statutory clauses containing
the phrase "on furlough or leave of absence."
Id. at 725. See Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957). In Borges the court
held that the statutory furlough and leave of absence clauses were meant to cover only
a very narrow group of economic advantages, i.e., fringe benefits, and do not control
"pay" or "status" or "seniority" and the rights flowing therefrom.
32 328 US. 275 (1946).
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Thus he does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he
stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war ....
He acquires not only the same seniority he had; his service in the armed
services is counted as service in the plant so that he does not lose ground
38
by reason of his absence.
The escalator principle is now in the act as subsection 9(c)(2), which expressly requires the employee to be "so restored in such manner as to
give him such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had
continued in such employment continuously from the time of his entering
the armed forces until the time of his restoration to such employment."8 4
To adequately grasp the nature and scope of the seniority provisions of
the act, it is essential to understand that the act does not create seniority;38
it merely protects the seniority given the employee by the nature of the
emploment relationship. Seniority is created by, and defined in, three basic
sources: (1) collective bargaining agreements,80 (2) accepted custom or
practice,3 7 and (3) unilateral employer action.88 One court has stated that
"the term seniority is not precisely defined in the Act and there are many
variations in the use of the seniority principle determined by the particular
contract or practice in effect in each case." 39 But every contract, and every
practice, is subject to one broad unchanging rule: it may not discriminate
against the veteran or punish him for his time in the service. 40 The concept
that the act merely protects seniority, and does not create it, has produced a
great deal of confusion. This confusion is reflected in the early controversy
over whether a veteran's seniority rights are determined by the collective
bargaining contract in effect when he departed from his civilian work or
by the contract in effect at his return. In 1947, the Third Circuit held that
a veteran returning to civilian employment was subject to the seniority
provisions of a new collective bargaining agreement between a labor union
33 Id. at 284-85. For a further discussion of the escalator principle see McKlnney v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958); Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 848 U.S. 960
(1955); Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278 (1949); Aeronautical Lodge 727 v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949); Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 (1947).
34 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(c)(2) (1964).
35 Aeronautical Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
36 E.g., Little v. Pennsylvania R.R., 95 F. Supp. 631 (D. Md. 1951); Harrison v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 77 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
37 E.g., McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958); see Freeman v. Gen.
cral Motors Corp., 86 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
38 See Wilson v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 147 F. Supp. 513 (NJD. Ill. 1957).
39 Freeman v. General Motors Corp., 86 F. Supp. 527, 529 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
40 See Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
338 U.S. 278 (1949).
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and his employer during the time he was serving in the armed forces.4 '
This decision created a conffict in the circuits and occasioned an avalanche
of law review discussion, some favoring the decision,' 2 others denouncing
43
it,
while still a third line argued that, at best, the statute was ambiguously

drawn and only policy arguments could resolve the controversy." Finally,
in 1949, this conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in Aeronautical
Lodge 727 v. Campbell 4 5 The Court took a position in accord with the
Third Circuit's decision. In a soundly reasoned opinion, the Court's analysis
showed insight into the nature of seniority within the meaning of the act.
Noting that the word "seniority" was placed in the act without definition,
the Court felt it apparent that Congress did not iritend to create a system
of seniority, but rather recognized its operation as a part of collective
bargaining, receiving both its scope and significance from union contracts.40
The Court further reasoned that to draw from the act an implication that
the date of employment is an inflexible basis upon which to determine
seniority rights as reflected in layoffs would be to ignore "a vast body of
long-established controlling practices in the process of collective bargaining
of which the seniority system to which that Act refers is a part."4 7 An example of such practices would be the demand by union negotiators of
safeguards to assure continuity in office of union stewards despite less
seniority merely on the basis of time. Underlying the Court's faith in the
integrity of the collective bargaining agreement is the express assumption
that the agreement seeks to protect all union members and is never used as a
device to subvert the rights of the veteran s This assumption is closely
related to the above-mentioned proposition that the veteran must not be
discriminated against because of his military service. 49 However, non-discriminatory changes in the bargaining contract should affect the absent
employee just as they would have affected him if he had remained at work.

This principle applies equally to seniority rights lost by contract changes
during the employee's absence as well as to rights gained during his absence.
It is important to note, however, that the term "seniority" includes not
only the right to a certain rank or position, which in a sense is merely an
abstract right without substance,5 0 but also all benefits that flow from
41 Gauveiller v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1947); accord,
Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1947).

Koury v.

42 E.g., 37 GEo. L.J. 585 (1948).
43 E.g., 34 VA. L Rv. 228 (1948).
44 27 NEB. L. Rxv. 126 (1948).
45

337 US. 521 (1949).

46 Id. at 526.
47

Id. at 527.

48 Id. at 529.
49 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
50 See Accardi v. Pennsylvania RRL., 383 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1966).
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seniority, 51 such as the right to advance to a better job classification, the
right to better working hours, or to higher pay.5 2 But this statement should
not be construed too broadly; throughout the history of the act, parties
opposing veterans' claims have insisted, and the courts have warned, that
the act does not grant a veteran "super-seniority."5 3 For example, in Fishgold
v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,54 a veteran was laid off a total of nine
days during the first year of his re-employment. Claiming immunity from
layoff for a year after his return to work,5 5 the veteran sought a declaratory
judgment to obtain compensation for the days he had not worked. The
Supreme Court rejected the veteran's claim, reasoning that acceptance of his
contentions would giv4 him an increase in seniority over that which he
would have had if he had not entered military service.50

When a re-employment problem involving seniority arises, it is important
to consider all factors that may have affected the veteran's working history.
The escalator principle is not a technique of speculation on what might
happen in the future, rather, it is "a reconstruction of all that would have

happened to the serviceman ... if he had remained in civilian employment,
51 Id. at

230.

52 Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 739 (2d Cir. 1957). This principle, that se.

niority as used in the statute covers all benefits flowing therefrom, has even wider significance in promotion cases as evidenced by this excerpt from the SoLuciToa's GuE:
Rights that are not in themselves the right to promotion but antecedent to It and
commonly associated with it are fully protected by the statutes, whether they are
seniority rights or rights arising from a certain status, a particular position, or mere
employment. Such rights would include:
(1) the right to bid on a vacancy;
(2) the right to correct computation of one's seniority, consistent with statutory
principles, and to its recognition in connection with every other right or advantage of which seniority is a condition;
(3) the right of access to any examination or other test within the control of the
employer;
(4) the right of access to work, which is a condition of advancement, in accordance with any priority for work established by contract or practice; and
(5) the right to make any choice, where such choice is either an express contract
right or an actual necessity for enjoyment of the fruits of a right.
SotucrroR's GUIDE 805.
53 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 828 U.S. 275 (1946); Olin Industries,

Inc. v. Barnett, 64 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ill. 1946).
54 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
55 Section 8(e) of the Selective Service Act of 1940, now 50 U.S.C. ArP. § 459(c)(1)
(1964), provided that a re-employed veteran should not be dismissed without cause for a
period of one year following restoration to employment. And even after the first year of
re-employment, the veteran's seniority protected by the statute continues and is not subject to discriminatory modification. See Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278 (1949).
But such seniority continues to be subject to limitations applicable to all other employees. Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
50 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/7

8

1967]

N/A: Veterans' Re-Employment Rights under the Universal Military Train

VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

based on the rights available to employees and employer and the history of
.the employer's enterprise." 57 Therefore, all developments in the employer's
business, changes in collective bargaining contracts and management practices related to employment, plant layoffs, opportunities for promotion,
activities of fellow employees-all possible employment changes-will be
relevant in reconstructing the theoretical history of what would have
happened to the veteran if he had remained at work.
Because seniority is most often created by the collective bargaining contract, it becomes important in drafting the agreement58 to consider its
applicability to the veteran seeking re-employment. Although litigation
under the act may be somewhat limited due to the employer's recognition
of the veteran's statutory re-employment rights and his willingness to help
the veteran upon his return to work,59 it is nonetheless true that in certain
areas litigation has been protracted and quite bitter. This is particularly
true in cases regarding missed promotions. In seeking to reduce the possibility of conflict, it is all the more necessary to draft the agreement with
the veteran in mind.
Recent cases6 0 have held that promotions are not automatic if the bargaining agreement provides for their dependence on the discretion of the employer; thus, irrespective of seniority, the veteran is not entitled to a
promotion unless chosen in the reasonable discretion of the employer. In
light of these decisions, some employers may attempt to retain complete
discretion with regard to promotions. The courts, however, have made a
further refinement which may limit this tactic. In 1965, the Seventh Circuit,6 1 in remanding for further finding of fact, said that despite the
language of the bargaining agreement vesting discretion in the employer,
if in practice promotions were not discretionary, but virtually automatic,
the employee would be entitled to the higher position as a matter of right;
the wording of the contract did not control because it did not represent the
actual treatment of the problem by the parties. Of course, the price of
gaining such discretion is the proper subject of labor-management discussions, but it would seem that the parties must place a realistic interpretation
on the discretion retained by the employer.
PROMOTIONS AND TRANsFERs

Missed promotions and transfers have been areas of increasing difficulty
and conflict, causing considerably more litigation than other provisions of
GUIDE 709. (Emphasis added.)
58 CCH provides a somewhat outdated but nonetheless useful work on various labor
57 SOLICITOR'S

xelations contract clauses. CCH UNION CON'mACr CLAUSES

51257 (1954).

59 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 6701.
60 E.g., Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964); McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-

Te.
61

R.PR, 57 U.S. 265 (1958). "
Witty v. Louisville & N.R.R., 342 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1965).
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the act. The litigation is voluminous primarily because of the number of
potential parties in interest-the veteran, the employee who replaced him,
the employer, and the union. Additionally, the employer may desire a court
ruling on the rights of a veteran under the post-service employment provisions in order to avoid grievance arbitration. The cases are often confusing,
for the parties in interest may assume contrary positions because of their
conflicting interests in the outcome. For example, if a case concerns the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the union might intervene, seeking the interpretation advocated by the veteran, or the employee
who replaced him, or the employer. Since it is apparent that the veteran
can suffer substantial loss in the area of transfers and promotions, this has
been selected as the focal point for the seniority discussion.
It would be an impossible task to meaningfully discuss the many court
decisions that have dealt with the problem of transfers and missed promotions. As mentioned above, the cases are numerous, and many are good
authority only on their own facts. Nevertheless, certain patterns of interpretation have developed.
As mentioned earlier, the Fishgold case0 2 first announced the escalator
principle. The broad language of the opinion, later codified with the same
lack of preciseness, set the tone for much of the subsequent litigation.
Thus, courts have been forced to analyze factual situations without the
certainty of fixed principles on which to base their reasoning. Even at
present, over twenty-five years after the enactment of the basic statute, and
despite its numerous amendments, there are still portions of the act which
lack judicial interpretations setting forth principles from which courts
can reason and toward which courts can move in applying the statutory
law. And some courts, perhaps because of the absence of any delineated
principles, have unfortunately been content to dispose of cases by the
application of transparent labels-the use of over-simplification rather than
attempting to deal with the complex problems involved.
The courts rapidly developed a requirement in promotion cases that,
unless the veteran could show that he had an automatic right to a higher
job, he was not entitled to retroactive seniority to reflect his years in
service. 63 For example, in Harvey v. Braniff Int'l Airways, Inc.,04 the veteran,
a pilot, was re-employed by his employer and given a position reflecting
an accrual of seniority during the time spent in military service, but he
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
Addison v. Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R., 204 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1953); Raulins v.
Memphis Union Station Co., 168 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1948); Harvey v. Braniff Int'l Airways,
Inc., 164 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1947); Hewitt v. System Federation, 161 F.2d 545 (7th Cir.
1947).
64 164 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1947); see Sherman, Seniority and Promotion Rights of Re.
employed Veterans, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 20, 31 (1955).
62

63
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was paid at the minimum base rate for the position. The veteran admitted
that he had been restored to all seniority rights to which he was entitled,
but claimed that under the bargaining agreement then in force, he was
entitled to a base pay equal to that which he would have received had
he been working at his job during the time spent in the military. The
court rejected his contention on a finding that seniority gave the veteran
only a right to take the test which qualified him for the higher position;
because under the bargaining agreement the pay rate for the job was based
on the time spent in the position, not seniority rights. The court's concluding remarks became very familiar in the years immediately following
the decision:
Where an employee has no fixed or absolute right to promotion and
where his right to promotion depends upon qualifications over and
above mere length of service, the employer has fully complied with
the terms of the [act] when he restores the veteran to the same position
or one of like seniority.and pay which he held at the time of his induction into the service. In subsequently promoting the employee, the
employer is not required to pay him more than the wage or salary
attaching to his new rank at the time he assumes it.05
The court further clarified the automatic right doctrine by holding that
even a showing of a high probability that such promotion would have
occurred was not sufficient to bring the veteran within the protection of
the statute.66 Two cases decided during this early period indicate a minority view. In the first case, 67 promotions were achieved by allowing employees
with the highest seniority to bid for the higher position. One employee
was serving in the military when an opening arose on which he would
have had the right to bid had he been present. The court held that
the first vacancy occurring after the employee's entry into the military
service and to which his seniority gave him the right to bid was kept open
until his military discharge. The second case s involved an employer practice of allowing employees with the highest seniority to apply for job
transfers as workers in different departments were needed. Even though
this transfer was at the election of the employee, and not automatic, the
court held that the re-employment provisions required the employee to
make an application for transfer as of the date when he would have been
able to do so but for his absence due to military service.6 9 Although these
65 Id. at 522.
66 Ibid. See also cases cited note 63 supra.
67 Morris v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 171 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 US.
967 (1949).
68 Conner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
69 Id. at 858.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

11

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 7

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:293

cases show a liberal application of the post-service employment provisions,
they did not represent the prevailing view at the time. 0
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 71 a per
curiam decision which summarily rejected the prevailing majority view.
In Diehl the veteran demanded seniority above several non-veterans under
a bargaining agreement providing that seniority in a certain position was
to be given in the order in which employees completed 1160 days experience. The Court of Appeals refused to award the seniority, reasoning that
to do so would give the veteran "a kind of superseniority not contemplated
by any statute." 72 In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on its opinion
in Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R.,73 which had strongly re-emphasized the
escalator principle stating that the employee was to be treated "as though
74
he had remained continuously in his civilian employment."
When the Supreme Court issued its per curiam decision in Diehl, there
75
was no disagreement as to the significance of the case. As one authority
said, Diehl made no changes in the prior law and, in reality, it was merely
a case in which advancement was dependent upon retroactive completion
of a certain number of work days. This reasoning, though technically correct, seems to present an overly restrictive interpretation. The preferable
considerations seem to be those expressed by the Solicitor:
The rationale dearly was that the veteran won when he was able to
establish that, though he fulfilled all contract conditions, he would
still suffer a direct penalty for military service, unless the court granted
him relief, and lost when he could not demonstrate that his inferior
position was produced by his military service. This is the true test.70
This approach lends flexibility to the determination of cases within the
spirit of the act, rather than limiting the court to a process of labeling a
particular provision as "automatic" or "based on seniority."
But in 1957, those who had hoped that the Diehl decision would mean
an expanding liberal interpretation of the act in promotion cases were
70 Sherman, supra note 64, at 35.
71 348 U.S. 960, reversing per curiam, 211 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1954).
72 Diehl v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 211 F.2d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 1954).
73 338 U.S. 278 (1949).
74 Id. at 285.
75 Sherman, supra note 64, at 35.
70 SotcrroR's GUIDE § 6.333, at 808. The Secretary of Labor has been given the responsibility under the act, § 9(h), to aid veterans in making their claims. The Sourroa's
GuIDE represents the Secretary's interpretation of the act and the various decisions tnder

the act. Therefore, this Guide must be read with these facts in mind, because often the
conclusions rendered therein are permeated with the Department's views and not necessarily those of the courts. But in retrospect, as to the cited material in the text, the
Department's position seems to have been the correct one.
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met by the language of the Supreme Court in McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.Tex. R.R., 77 indicating that if a promotion depends upon fitness and ability and the veteran is given the position on the basis of longevity, he is not
entitled to seniority in his new position from the date he would have had
the opportunity to qualify for it had he remained at work. Although
McKinney did not criticize Diehl or overtly indicate modification of its
implications, it did seem to preclude extension of the spirit of Diehl (which
dealt only with retroactive seniority once the veteran received his promotion) to cases of promotion and the seniority resulting therefrom. Perhaps the most accurate description of the impact of McKinney upon subsequent re-employment cases is found in the SorcrroR's GumE:
The McKinney case has been considered by several lower courts as
putting a drastic limitation on the application of the escalator principle of promotions and the resulting seniority; language in the
opinion has been applied to situations very different from factual
considerations by the Supreme Court. 78
The above proposition is demonstrated in the Eighth Circuit decision
of Tilton v. Missouri Pac. RS.79 In this case employees, pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement then in force, were provisionally upgraded
to a higher position while retaining the seniority of their previous position.
They were to retain this seniority until the completion of 1040 days of
service at their new job; at the end of this period the employees would
have the opportunity to elect seniority applicable to their higher positions.
The employees were called into military service during this 1040-day period
and upon returning to work were given the same relative position on the
seniority roster which they had held prior to the interruption in employment, thus requiring that they complete that portion of the 1040-day period
left unserVed at the time they had left to enter the service. Upon completion of their training period of 1040 days, the employees demanded a
seniority which would reflect their absence while in service, pointing to
the fact that non-veterans who had been junior to them on the seniority
roster when they left employment for military service were now senior to
them in their new positions. The court held that the veterans were not
entitled to retroactive seniority. The court started with the obvious proposition that when a work period is for the development of proficiency it
was not to be satisfied, in whole or in part, by military service, but to be
satisfied only by actual work. But it went on to hold that if a claimant's
promotion is not certain (such as situations in which comparative ability,

physical condition,- age, and employer's discretion are factors), but only
77 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
78 SoiCrroR's GuiDE 806.
79 306 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1962).
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probable-even highly probable-retroactive seniority is withheld, and
that later events may not be considered to dispel antecedent uncertainties.
Moreover, the court specifically recognized the Supreme Court decisions
in Diehl and McKinney but felt that the case before it was factually closer
to McKinney. But in any event, if Diehl and McKinney were inconsistent,
the court felt obliged to follow the latter; a determination which in effect
would have rendered Diehl almost barren of future usefulness.
But, two years later, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit80
and rejected its interpretation of McKinney on two grounds. First, McKinney was not intended to and did not overrule Diehl. Second, McKinney
did not establish a requirement of absolute foreseeability.8 1 The Court
stated that McKinney turned primarily on one factor: "the collective bargaining agreement there in issue made the exercise of management discretion a prerequisite to promotion." It further emphasized that in McKinney
the veteran was expressly allowed to amend his complaint. The Court
concluded:
Properly read, therefore, McKinney holds that where advancement
depends on an employer's discretionary choice not exercised prior to
entry into service, a returning veteran cannot show within the reasonable certainty required by the Act that he would have enjoyed advancement simply by virtue of continuing employment during the time
82
he was in military service.

In contrast, Tilton was concerned with employer discretion which was
exercised prior to the employee's departure for military service. Thus it
seems clear that McKinney still retains vitality within the bounds set forth
in the above quotation.
Less dear, however, is the impact of McKinney and Tilton on the requirement that the rights and benefits claimed by the veteran must have
accrued automatically. Did Tilton abolish the requirement, or did it
merely define more adequately the nature of the automatic accrual?
Although some aspects of Tilton are not dear, it seems that the decision
did make definite two propositions which would have been rejected under
the logic of McKinney. The first proposition is best stated by the Court
itself:
In every veteran seniority case the possibility exists that work of the
particular type might not have been available; that the veteran would
not have elected to accept the higher position; that sickness might
have prevented him from continuing his employment. In light of the
purpose and history of this statute, however, we cannot assume that
80 Tilton v. Missouri Pac.

R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964).

81 Id. at 179.
82 Id. at 180.
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Congress intended possibilities of this sort to defeat the veteran's
seniority rights.83
The second proposition changes the very nature of the "automatic accrual"

requirement. The narrow confines of McKinney (and decisions of those
courts which have followed that decision) gave literal meaning to the re-

quirement of automatic accrual by using a strict foreseeability test. But
Tilton rejected this test in favor of a more liberal standard. It held that

the automatic accrual requirement is satisfied "if, as a matter of foresight,
it was reasonably certain that advancement would have occurred, and if,
as a matter of hindsight, it did in fact occur." Therefore, by these two

propositions, Tilton clarified the law and provided a more flexible standard by which to approach the application of the seniority provisions of

the act to the often complex re-employment problems facing the courts.
Although no cases have dealt specifically with the McKinney-TilLon

problems, several recent decisions help clarify this area of the law. The
decision which best shows the attitude of the Supreme Court toward the
seniority problem is the case of Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R.8A In Accardi,
the petitioners worked as firemen on tugboats. In 1942, their employment
was interrupted by three years military service after which each was reemployed and restored to his former position as a fireman with the same
seniority he had before leaving plus credit for his absence. In 1960, petitioners' jobs were abolished and they were discharged, each receiving a
severance allowance. The amount of this allowance was based on the
length of "compensated service" with the railroad. In computing their
allowances, the railroad did not include the years spent in the service as
compensated service. Petitioners claimed that this determination was in
violation of the re-employment statute; the railroad insisted that the severance pay was not based on seniority and therefore the statute was not
applicable. The Court held that the employees' allowances should reflect
the years in service. In reaching this decision the Court manifests a flexible
approach to, and a sophisticated understanding of, the post.service employment statutes. The Court recognized that seniority derives its substance
from employment agreements and practices, but further stated that this
did not mean that employers and unions could deprive a veteran of substantial rights guaranteed by the act under the guise of "transparent labels
and definitions."' 5 The Court did not fully define the phrase "substantial
rights guaranteed by the Act," but subsequent language of the opinion
reveals the attitude of the Court. It agreed that the returning veteran is
entitled only to those rights and benefits which would have automatically
83 Id. at 180-81.
84 383 US. 225 (1966).
85 Id.: at 229.
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accrued, thus dispelling any notion that Tilton abolished this automatic
accrual requirement. Looking to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the amounts of the payments were
based primarily on the employee's length of service with the railroad. This
use of the term "primary" is important for it seems to reflect a flexible
and realistic approach to the particular factual situation. The Court further stated that the provisions of the act are not satisfied by giving to the
returning veteran seniority in some general abstract sense and then denying him the benefits that flow therefrom.8 6
A recent arbitrator's decision 87 illustrates the complexity and wide spectrum of problems that may accompany veteran re-employment cases. The
decision cuts across many of the problems that have been discussed heretofore; and although not having the decisional effect of the previously
mentioned cases, it does reflect a view in harmony with the principles
encouraged in this Note. In this decision several jobs opened for employee
bidding when the veteran was in military service. The practice of the employer was to allow employees to bid for jobs as openings arose; the job
going to the bidder with the highest seniority. The only qualification for
the position in dispute, which involved a transfer, was that its holder must
have passed an intelligence test. This requirement had been met by the
veteran before leaving for military service. Because it was thought at the
time of the bidding that the job might be temporary (although it was listed
as permanent), no employee bid for the job and the employer hired a new
employee to fill the position. Upon his return from the service, the veteran
saw that the position had developed into a permanent one and using this
hindsight said that he would have bid for the position had he been present.
He was given the position, and the employee who had been working at
the job brought a grievance proceeding for the return of his job. Both the
position of the union ss and of the employer 89 are carefully set forth in the
decision as reported. The union attempted to distinguish a promotion from
a transfer, arguing that the transfer in the present case involved such a
degree of employee discretion as to make it impossible to determine whether
the veteran would have bid for the job had he been working at the time
it came open. The union further urged recognition that the requirements
of automatic advancement by mere passage of time and the certainty that
the veteran would have bid did not exist in this case.90
86 Id. at 280.
87 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. Chalmette Works & Aluminum Workers Int'l, (18411 (1966).
2 ARB
88 Id. at 4406.
89 Id. at 4407.
00 The union was adamant in pressing this point, contending that the proposed result
would give to returning veterans,
... such vast and unchartered rights that it would remove any meaning from the
bidding procedure and seniority proceedings . . . . We think that the veteran Is
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The employer took the position that the speculation and variables involved in this case could no longer be asserted as reasons for denying a
veteran his re-employment rights. While recognizing that a veteran may
be denied rights if the job is contingent upon ability and upon an exercise
of discretion by the employer, the company nevertheless asserted that the
mere right of the veteran to exercise discretion was beyond the scope of
this exception.
The arbitrator was well aware that this situation contained issues that

had not been decided by the courts. For example, this was not only a promotion to a higher position, as in Tilton, but was a transfer to a different
department, and it was, as mentioned by the arbitrator, a transfer "fraught
with variables." 9 ' Furthermore, Tilton did not involve a factual hindsight
to the extreme degree as did the present case, and the possibility of inequality to co-employees was by no means as patent. 2 Language in the decision
which seems to indicate an abandonment of the automatic accrual requirement 93 is balanced by later references which negate any such inference-04
The arbitrator did not reject this requirement but merely applied the
flexible "matter of hindsight" approach of Tilton and permitted the veteran to keep the job, even though doing so seemed to give the veteran a
type of super-seniority over those employees who never had the advantage
of hindsight. In reaching this result the arbitrator showed a willingness
to exclude certain variables and contingencies excludable under the mandate of Tilton.
Of course it is arguable that even the liberal attitude of the Tilton view
of "automatic" does not extend to the admittedly far-reaching conclusions
reached in this arbitrator's decision. But it may just as easily be argued
that the Tilton mandate was as broad as it was flexible and that in spirit
it dictates the arbitrator's decision.
CONCLUSION
It is widely felt that the language of this statute is broad and ambiguous.95 However, the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress inentitled to those things which he would have attained in a routine manner in his
absence .... But we do take serious issue with giving veterans "hindsight" discretionary opportunities all at one time to twenty jobs from which he may pick one.
He
We don't think the Act ever meant that, yet that is what was done here ....
is allowed now to look back on that job opportunity and know now that it is permanent and say now 'I want the job that nobody bid for at that time.'
Ibid.
91 Id. at 4410.
92 Ibid.
93 Id. at 4409.
94 See id. at 4412.
9s Yet the courts have held that the act is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. Hall
v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Ky. 1944).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

17

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 7

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:293

tended it to be remedial in scope. Thus, the courts, armed with their mandate to liberally construe the act, have generally been anxious to protect
the returning veteran. But the courts went through a period in which they
withheld benefits to the veteran when, according to the accepted "automatic
accrual" standard, a promotion or right was not absolutely certain as a
matter of foresight. Generally, the courts following this view used a highly
technical approach in which the attachment of a broad label such as "discretionary," "uncertain," or "not entirely automatic" was used to deny the
veteran's claim. Little effort was made to go beyond these superficial aspects
of the case and determine whether in fact the veteran had lost ground because of his military service. Notwithstanding these cases, there has developed an unclear pattern which repudiates the foregoing approach. The
Tilton decision represents a significant turning point in the formulation
of this new, more flexible approach. The most recent instance of this new
attitude is seen in the arbitrator's decision previously mentioned. A decision
such as this, whether correct or incorrect on the particular facts presented,
would have been unheard of ten or fifteen years ago. Of course the critics
of this new approach will readily point to cases of this nature, arguing
that the flexibility and uncertainty of this approach provides the opportunity for abuses that will surely occur. And they will assert that this hindsight approach gives the veteran a type of super-seniority, i.e., he is given
the benefit of certainty as to all those events which would have been uncertain had he remained in civilian employment. Admittedly, all of these
criticisms are valid. But contrast the result here advocated with the result
under the older, more restrictive view. Under the older approach, veterans
were summarily denied advantages which in retrospect they should have
and would have obtained. Further, under McKinney and similar cases, a
near impossible burden was placed on the veteran to show that his rights
and benefits would have automatically accrued. Undoubtedly, there are
disadvantages that may flow from the adoption of the more flexible approach. But it is submitted that the flexible approach is preferable for
several reasons. In the past, some courts have allowed their overwhelming
fear of granting the veteran super-seniority to interfere with a reasoned
approach to the problem. However, the legislative history of the act and
its early judicial interpretation clearly show that the purpose of the act
was to restore the veteran as nearly as possible to a position which he
would have attained had he remained continuously in his civilian employment. Thus, the rule against super-seniority should at best be treated as
a corollary or limitation to the above principle. Absolute denial of all
possible super-seniority is not the purpose of the act and it should not be
allowed to so dominate a court's thinking that the court loses sight of the
real purposes of the act. The new approach discards neither the prohibition of super-seniority nor the requirement of automatic accrual, but it
properly shifts the emphasis so that the major concern is restoration of
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the veteran to the status he would have attained had he not entered the
military. The basic outlines of this new approach have been sketched in
a case to case discussion. Where is the law today and in what direction
should it move?

Fundamental in approaching any seniority question is the necessity of
isolating the exact nature of the problem under consideration. 0 For example, some promotions are based strictly upon length of service. Here there
can be little doubt that the employee's right to the promotion cannot be
denied. Other cases center upon passage of an examination or working a
specified number of days in a certain job before a promotion is granted.
Still other cases involve the exercise of discretion before the employee is
entitled to a promotion or transfer. If this discretion is vested in the employee, upon returning to work he must receive the opportunity to bid
on this job and exercise his discretion just as if he had been continuously
employed. If discretion is vested in the employer, there are several relevant
inquiries. The history of other employees must be examined to establish
the past use of this discretion. Patterns of discrimination against veterans
must be investigated. If in fact the promotion depends upon employer
discretion as to the ability or skill of the employee, then it would be quite
difficult for the veteran to prove that this promotion would have automatically accrued. But here again, in light of current developments, it
seems proper to further question whether the judgment of the employer
was based on intangible qualities and uncertain circumstances, or whether
they were based on more predictable considerations.
After these factors have been delineated, it is then necessary to recognize
the various changes in the law that make up the flexible approach that has
been referred to previously, and apply this approach to these factors. The
very essence of this new approach is an attempt to reach the substance of
a factual situation rather than dismiss the veteran's claim with a flurry of
slogans and labels. True, courts still retain the requirement that rights
and benefits must have automatically accrued in order for the veteran to
later claim them, but the nature of this requirement has undergone substantial change. The courts have declared that certain possibilities are initially rejected as grounds for defeating the veteran's claim. They have
radically changed the test for determining "automatic accrual." No longer
is the veteran saddled with the near impossible burden of proving that as
a matter of foresight his right would have been certain to accrue. Now
this certainty requirement is met if "as occurred, and if, as a matter of
hindsight, it did in fact occur." The Court in Tilton said:
: .. it would be virtually impossible for a veteran to show .. .that
it was absolutely certain, "as a matter of foresight," when he entered
96 It is quite helpful to compare the attitudes and approaches of different parties to
the -arious types of promotion clauses and to their interpretations. Compare SoucrroR's
GumE 811, with Sherman, supra note 64, at 35.
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military service that all circumstances essential to obtaining an ad.
vancement in status would later occur. To exact such certainty as a
condition for insuring a veteran's seniority rights would render these
statutorily protected rights without real meaning. 07
Thus courts are beginning to speak in terms of reasonable certainty and
not the absolute certainty with which they previously denied rights and
benefits.
These developments should not be interpreted as guaranteeing the veteran a promotion on his return from service, though certainly they do
guarantee him an opportunity to prove that such promotion could reasonably have been expected to occur. The employer is not forced to promote
a man who does not have the ability, nor does it force promotion where
the employer would not have promoted an employee whether he went into
the service or not. Likewise, the courts continue to recognize the sanctity
of employer discretion, although paradoxically it is sometimes the union
that vehemently supports this position. But even in the area of employer
discretion, the courts are unwilling to let the mere label "employer discretion" prevent them from making a realistic appraisal of whether discretion does exist and if so, whether it is present merely to prevent the veteran
from gaining his statutory rights. This is the area in which future development should take place. For instance, it is likely that in many situations
the employer's discretion in promotion and transfer cases is based on certain well established criteria. In such cases can it not be said to be highly
probable that a veteran would have been selected for the transfer or promotion had he been present? The merits of this conclusion were recognized
by the Solicitor long before the recent developments discussed above.
There is, moreover, sound reason for considering that courts should
not deny at least limited review, wherever an exercise of discretion,
limited or apparently unlimited under the contract, has proved to be
subject to review in grievance proceedings, under the terms of the
collective bargaining for labor relations is not comparable to ordinary
personal and commercial contracts. At the very least, courts should
not ignore the distinction between unlimited discretion, and employer
choices that must, under the contract, turn on specified criteria. 08
This view is more consistent with the intent of the act and with recent
judicial developments. It goes directly to the substance of a re-employment
issue, attempting to deal with realities rather than ceasing the inquiry at
the first mention of employer discretion. Even though this approach may
require more sophisticated and delicate decisions by the courts, such decisions will yield a result which is fair, reasonable and realistic.
J. L. C., Jr.
Tilton v. Missouri & Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169, 180 (1964).
08 SouicrroR's GumE 810.
97
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